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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WOODLAND THEATRES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, 
INC., a corporation, and 
PLITT INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
) Case No, 
) Case No. 
14440 
14441 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The plaintiff-appellant has not followed the 
requirements of Rule 75 (p) (2) with respect to the matters 
to be included in the appellant's brief, but, in an apparent 
attempt to create the appearance of factual disputes, (even 
though this appeal involves but two clear-cut legal issues) 
has combined elements of fact and argument in the various 
introductory statements in the first ten pages of its brief. 
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The defendant-respondent does not agree with these state-
ments because they improperly attempt to create the atmosphere 
of a factual issue and purport to state as matters of fact, 
arguments and contentions of counsel which are not facts 
supported in the record. For convenience, the plaintiff-
appellant will be referred to in this brief as "plaintiff" 
and the defendant-respondent will be referred to as "defendant". 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal involves two cases, consolidated in the 
court below and here, seeking to forfeit a lease of a drive-in 
theatre, seeking damages, and seeking under the unlawful 
detainer statute repossession of the premises, all for alleged 
breaches of the lease. Two clear-cut legal issues are presented 
to this Court: whether the plaintiff, by acceptance of rent 
with knowledge of the alleged breaches, waived these breaches, 
and a subordinate issue of whether the defendant had an obli-
gation to maximize profits. 
Disposition of the Case 
in the Lower Court 
Based on alleged breaches of a lease of a drive-in 
theatre owned by plaintiff, plaintiff sought to forfeit the 
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lease and recover alleged damages. Plaintiff filed, in the 
Summer of 1974, two separate actions, one under the Utah 
Unlawful Detainer Statute, Section 78-36-3 et seq., Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), Civil No. 221688, and the second under 
a complaint entitled "Complaint for Breach of Lease and 
Termination of Lease11, Civil No, 222497, 
The lease violations alleged in the first case 
were essentially the same as those in the second, with the 
difference that in the second there were alleged some addi-
tional breaches not raised in the unlawful detainer action. 
More than one year after filing of the complaint and after 
extensive discovery, the defendant filed motions for summary 
judgment in both actions, based upon the ground that even 
if it is assumed that plaintiff's allegations of lease vio-
lations were well taken, by the acceptance of rent with 
knowledge of such breaches, plaintiff, as a matter of law, 
had waived the breaches and that, contrary to plaintiff's 
allegations, defendant had no duty under the lease to 
maximize revenues from the leased premises. 
The motions for summary judgment were heard by 
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on December 12, 1975 and 
both sides presented their arguments through written memoranda 
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submitted prior to hearing and by extensive oral argument. 
After further deliberation, the trial court granted summary 
judgment for respondent in both cases on December 24, 1975. 
The plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing which presented 
no new material not previously considered by the court and 
the motion, after hearing, was denied. 
Facts 
Where, as in this case, there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact, Rule 56 directs that a summary 
While it is not of major significance, the persis-
tent overreaching of the plaintiff in its brief, is some 
indication of the weakness of its position. In addition to 
those factual inaccuracies noted below, the plaintiff, by 
stating that the motion for summary judgment was made on 
December 12, 1975 (p. 2) and was heard and ruled on on December 
12, 1975 (p, 4) appears to suggest that the motion was not 
fully considered below. Quite the contrary is true. The 
plaintiff filed its complaint in the Summer of 1974. The 
motion for summary judgment was filed well over a year later 
on November 20, 1975, together with a memorandum in support 
thereof, after fairly extensive discovery. It was heard by 
the court on December 12, 1975. Plaintiff did not file its 
memorandum until December 11, 1975, the day before the hear-
ing, The court took the matter under advisement and entered 
judgment on December 24, 1975, (See dates on various plead-
ings in the record and also the Summary Judgment, R. 90, 
Vol. I, 342 Vol, 2), 
Note. The record in this case is in two volumes, 
apparently because there are two consolidated cases. The 
record in district court numbered 2211688 will be referred 
to as Volume 1 and the record in district court numbered 
222497 (the second case filed by plaintiff) will be referred 
to as Volume 2. 
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judgment shall be granted. The plaintiff here has followed 
the traditional tactic of a party resisting summary judgment 
where his legal position is untenable, by attempting to create 
the atmosphere of a factual dispute in order to avoid the 
clear mandate of Rule 56. Moreover, plaintiff's statement 
of facts itself contains gross overstatements in a patent 
attempt to shock the court and create an atmosphere of bad 
faith on the part of defendant.^ On this appeal, however, 
zFor example, the plaintiff refers (p. 7 of appel-
lant's brief) to the fence being "weathered and unpaintedM 
but fails to state that there is absolutely no reference to 
this in the record, fails to state that it is a grape stake 
fence that is intended to have a natural weathered appearance, 
is not intended to be painted and has never been painted and 
was not painted when the plaintiff leased the theatre to defen-
dant. Nor does plaintiff even allude to the fact that the fence 
in many parts is worn out and can no longer be repaired but 
should be replaced and under case law it is the landlord*s and 
not the tenant*s responsibility to replace worn out parts of 
the premises. See e.g., Paul v. Paul*s Liquor Store Co., 
217 A2d 197 (Del. 1966); Presbyterian Distributing Service v. 
Darling, 166 A2d 308 (Pa, 1960); Maggio v. Cox, 63 So.2d 167 
(La. 1953). Another example is that plaintiff constantly 
states that ABC "assigned the lease" when in fact there is 
not one item in the record showing any assignment. The only 
item in the record is that the stock of ABC Intermountain 
Theatres, Inc. was sold to a new stockholder and the corporate 
name was changed to Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc. (Defen-
dant's Answers to Interrogatories 9 and 10, R. 100-105; 127-
129, Vol. 2). Plaintiff attempts to create the atmosphere 
that there are two separate corporations when in fact there 
is but one and plaintiff has never effected service of process 
on any but one corporate entity, Other examples of plaintiff's 
overstatements to the extent that they may be of assistance 
in the argument will be referred to in the argument. 
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the exact nature or extent of the alleged breaches is 
irrelevant. Needless to say, defendant denies these claims 
of the plaintiff, along with any other claims of wrong doing 
on its part, and has affirmatively shown in the record 
(Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories 9-10, R. 100-105; 
127-129, Vol. 2) the expenditures of very substantial sums 
of money by it in an effort to satisfy a difficult landlord 
and make certain that it had cured within the grace period 
given in the lease, even the tenuous claims of the landlord. 
However, for purposes of the present appeal, all of the alle-
gations of breach which are actually made by appellant in its 
complaint (but not the exaggerations of those allegations 
made by counsel in his brief) must be accepted as true and 
there is, therefore, no genuine issue concerning them. 
There are some facts, however, which plaintiff has 
omitted, which are material to the lower court's disposition 
of this matter - namely, certain admissions by the plaintiff 
that it did accept rent after knowledge of the alleged breaches. 
It will be helpful to include these admissions for reference 
in this brief and also to set out a more accurate description 
of the allegations made by the plaintiff. 
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As stated in plaintiff's statement of facts, the 
plaintiff, Woodland Theatres, Inc., entered into a lease with 
the defendant, which was then known as ABC Intermountain 
Theatres, Inc., providing for the lease of the Woodland 
3 
Drive-In Theatre premises for a term of fifteen years. The 
lease provided for the payment of a minimum annual guaranteed 
rental of $32,500.00 (payable in 12 monthly installments of 
$2,708.33 each) against a percentage rental based on a percent 
of gross receipts. 
The plaintiff's unlawful detainer action was filed 
in August of 1974 and all of the alleged violations of the lease 
referred to in that action occurred prior to June 26, 1974. 
(Paragraph 9 of the complaint, R. 3, Vol, 1). The second 
action was filed in September of 1974, alleging breaches of 
the lease occurring prior to that date. 
The alleged breaches in the unlawful detainer action, 
basically stated, were that defendant had filed: 
A copy of the lease agreement is attached as 
Exhibit "A" to the plaintiff's brief. Although defendant 
denies that that document is a true and correct copy of the 
lease, it does appear that with respect to the portion of the 
lease material to the issues here raised, it is the same as 
the actual lease entered into by the parties and, therefore, 
as a matter of convenience, reference will be made to that 
document in this brief. 
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(a) to properly maintain the theatre (although 
a large amount of effort and money has been expended on theatre 
maintenance and improvement, an amount in excess of $54,000 
having been spent in 1974 alone - Defendant's Answers to 
Interrogatories 9 and 10, R, 100-105; 127-129, Vol 2); 
(b) to expand the snack bar within the time 
provided by the lease (although it is undisputed that this has 
since been accomplished - Defendant's Answer to Interrogatory 
17, R. 111-112, Vol. 2); 
(c) to move the theatre marquee, as required 
by the lease (although the plaintiff, in violation of para-
graph 31 of the lease, has not assisted in obtaining the zoning 
changes necessary to make such a move possible - Defendant's 
Answer to Interrogatory 17, R, 111, Vol. 2); 
(d) to pay the required rent (although it is 
undisputed that all rental due was regularly and promptly 
tendered and has now in fact been paid and accepted by 
plaintiff - Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admissions, 
R. 130-140, Vol, 2, and Affidavit of Edward Plitt, R. 75-78, 
Vol. 1). 
In addition, plaintiff took the position that defen-
dant^ changing its name from ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc. 
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to Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc., and the alleged sale 
of the stock of the defendant corporation by the former stock-
holder to the present stockholder, constituted an assignment 
of the lease in breach thereof. 
The complaint in the second suit reiterated the alle-
gations of the unlawful detainer complaint and alleged one addi-
tional breach, i.e. that respondent had breached an implied 
covenant of the lease to maximize the revenues from the leased 
premises. 
The following facts are admitted by plaintiff by its 
responses to the defendants requests for admissions: 
1. Prior to June 26, 1974, plaintiff received, 
accepted and retained the check of Plitt Intermountain Theatres, 
Inc. (which plaintiff alleges to be an unauthorized assignee of 
the lease), for rent for the period through July 31, 1974 
(plaintiff*s response to request for admissions No. 1, R. 130-131, 
Vol. 2); 
2. Prior to accepting this check, plaintiff had heard 
"rumors" that ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc. was considering 
a sale of its theatre operations (plaintiff1s response to 
request for admissions No. 3, R. 131-132, Vol, 2); 
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3. Said check was retained until July 3, 1974 when 
it was returned to defendant with a letter of plaintiff's 
attorney setting forth various alleged breaches.(R. 132-133, 
Vol. 2); 
4. Thereafter, for a period until December, 1974 
plaintiff each month regularly returned the checks tendered 
for rent. (R. 132-133, Vol. 2); 
5. In December 1974 subsequent to plaintiff's send-
ing detailed notices of breach of the lease in July and August 
1974, and subsequent to the filing of each of these cases (and, 
therefore, with full knowledge of the alleged breaches of the 
lease), plaintiff accepted all rental payments which it had 
previously rejected. (R. 138, Vol. 2); 
6. There was no agreement that by accepting rent 
plaintiff was not waiving the breaches of the lease and there 
is nothing in the record to support the contention of plaintiff 
4 
that acceptance of the rent was so conditioned. 
^The only item in the record involved with these checks 
is the letter of defendant's counsel sent to plaintiff's counsel, 
when the latter had indicated his desire to again accept the 
rent, stating "I am pleased that you see the error of your 
ways, and as requested by you, I am returning herewith the 
rent checks you previously delivered to me. The following 
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7, Plaintiff continued to accept regular rental 
payments thereafter and defendant is current in payment of 
rent. (R. 138-140, Vol. 2), 
The plaintiff having admitted the acceptance of rent, 
and it being required that the breaches alleged in the complaint 
must be taken as alleged for purposes of this appeal, there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff at the same time seeks both to forfeit 
the lease and to collect damages because of the various breaches 
which it alleges. Plaintiff states three separate issues, but 
there are really only two questions in issue on this appeal. 
The main question centers on the effect of plaintiff's having 
accepted rental payments with knowledge of the alleged breaches 
checks of Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc. are enclosed:11 
(R. 90, Vol. 2) If evidence outside the record were admitted, 
it would show that plaintiff1s counsel conceded in the one 
conversation when he requested repayment of the rent that by 
accepting the checks the question of waiver was thereby raised 
and it was at least waiving the asserted breach for the alleged 
assignment of the lease. Defendant has not previously raised 
this because it considers it improper to raise matters outside 
the record, in the nature of simple conversation between counsel, 
but in light of plaintifffs repeated assertions as to intentions 
in accepting the rent, this point should be mentioned. 
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for which it claims the right to forfeit the lease and also 
to collect damages. The basic issue presented for determinat-
ion by this court is whether by acceptance of rental payments 
under the lease, with knowledge of the alleged breaches, the 
lessor (plaintiff) waived those breaches. Waiver of the breaches 
would necessarily preclude utilization of the remedy of for-
feiture. Plaintiff bases its claim for damages upon what it 
claims to be an implied obligation of the tenant to maximize 
revenues from operation of the leased premises and this raises 
the second issue, whether the tenant (defendant in this appeal) 
had an obligation under the lease to maximize the revenues from 
the leased premises. 
These issues will be discussed in separate order. 
I 
BY ACCEPTANCE OF RENTAL PAYMENTS WITH 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE BREACHES ALLEGED BY 
PLAINTIFF, PLAINTIFF WAIVED THE BREACHES 
The principle that by proper expressions or conduct a 
landlord may waive his rights arising from breaches of a lease 
by his tenant is universally recognized. Plaintiff does not 
appear to quarrel with this fundamental rule but attempts to 
subvert that rule by insisting that whether a waiver exists is 
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somehow a matter resting upon the subjective intention of the 
landlord and suggests that the objective evidence of waiver, 
that is the acceptance of rent, must be ignored. That, however, 
is not the law. 
Acceptance of Rental Payments 
Waives the Alleged Breaches 
as a Matter of Law 
The cases are legion, near unanimous, in holding that 
the acceptance of rent with knowledge of breaches of the lease 
constitutes as a matter of law a waiver of the alleged breaches. 
Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp., 29 Utah 2d 231, 507 P. 2d 
713 (1973); Bailey v. Zlotnick, 133 F.2d 35 (B.C. App. 1942); 
Re Hool Realty Company, 2 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1924); Wing, Inc. v. 
Arnold, 107 S.2d 765 (Fla, 1959); Garbaczewski v. Vanucci 
96 N,E,2d 653 (111. 1950); Bobb v. Frank L. Talbot Theatre 
Company, 221 S,W. 372 (Mo. 1920); Plassmeyer v. Brenta, 94 A.2d 
508 (N.J. 1953); Thaophilakos v. Costello, 54 S.W. 2d 203 (Tex. 
1932); Fredeking v. Grimmett, 86 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1955); 
Major v. Hall, 251 So.2d 444 (La. 1971); Four Seasons, Inc. v. 
New Orleans Silversmith, Inc., 223 S.2d 686 (La. 1969); Edwards 
Fine Furniture Inc. v. Ditullio, 252 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1948); 
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Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1972); Larson v. 
Sjogren, 226 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1951); Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 
F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1959); Borst v. Ruff, 77 A.2d 343 (Conn. 
1950); Sanders v. Satlive Bros. & Co., 174 N.W. 267 (Iowa, 
1919); Guptill v, Macon Stone Supply Co., 79 S.E. 854 (Ga. 
1913); Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361 (Cal. 
1920; Snyder v. Hill, 45 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1951); Perry v. 
Waddelow, 145 F.Supp. 349 (E.D. 111., 1956); Weiss v. Johnson, 
190 N.E.2d 834 (111. 1963); Venters v. Reynolds, 354 S.W.2d 
521 (Ky. 1962); Globe Leather & Shoe Fendings, Inc. v. Goldburgh, 
159 N.E.2d 338 (Mass. 1959); Flying Service, Inc. v. Abitz, 
386 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. 1965); Reno Realty & Investment Co. v. 
Thornstein, 301 P.2d 1051 (Nev. 1956); Fairchild Realty v. 
Spiegel, Inc., 98 S.E.2d 871 (N.C. 1957); Thomas Peebles & 
Co. v. Sherman, 181 N.W. 715 (Minn. 1921); Port of Walla Walla 
v. Sun Glo Producers, Inc., 504 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1912); Katz v. 
Miller, 133 N.W. 1091 (Wis. 1912); Boiling v. King Coal Theaters, 
41 S,E.2d 59 (Va. 1947); Amisano v. Shaw, 227 S.W.2d 951 (Ark. 
1950); Butterfield v, Duquesne Mining Co., 182 P.2d 102 (Ariz. 
1947). 
These cases, representing 28 jurisdictions, are but 
a few of the vast number of cases supporting this general rule. 
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Even where a lawsuit has been commenced based on the 
breaches alleged by the landlord, this rule of waiver is applied 
where rent is accepted after suit is commenced. Bedford Invest-
ment Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1947); Jones v. Delia Maria, 
191 P.943 (Cal. 1920); Guptill v. Macon Stone Supply Co., 
79 S.E.854 (Ga. 1913); Borst v. Ruff, 77 A.2d 343 (Conn. 
1950); Fairchild Realty v. Spiegel, Inc., 98 S.E.2d 871 (N.C. 
1957) . Indeed, even where rent was accepted by the landlord 
in the midst of appeal, the rule has been applied. Snyder v. 
Hill, 45 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1951). It is conceded that on this 
point, one case cited by plaintiff, which although based on 
different facts, can be interpreted as holding to the 
contrary. 
Typical of the cases holding that by the acceptance 
of rent the landlord waives breaches of the lease, is Bedford 
Investment Company v. Folb, 180 P,2d 361 (Cal. 1947), where the 
lessee sublet the premises without the consent of the lessor. 
Based on this breach an unlawful detainer action was commenced. 
In the midst of the action the landlord accepted the payment 
of rent. Finding such acceptance to constitute a waiver 
of the right to maintain the action, the court noted: 
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"Respondent's acceptance of payment of the 
rental after the action was filed bars the 
right to forfeit the lease. The enforcement 
of covenants for forfeiture are avoided 
whenever possible. . . Since it is undisputed 
that the rent was paid up to the date of trial, 
the finding that respondent was entitled to 
damages in the amount of the rental value of 
$8.33 per day from May 31, 1946, and the judg-
ment for that amount were contrary to the evi-
dence and therefore erroneous. The payment of 
rent obviously bars any judgment against 
appellants for the rent and it likewise bars 
a judgment either for damages or for possession." 
Id. at 363. (Emphasis added). 
The language in another California decision explains 
well the basis for these decisions. In Jones v. Delia Maria, 
191 P.943 (Cal. 1920), the landlord sued to forfeit the lease 
because of the tenant's failure to post: a bond required by the 
lease. While the suit was pending, the landlord accepted past 
due rent. In finding the acceptance to constitute a waiver, 
the California court stated: 
"The acceptance of such rent by plaintiff was 
a waiver of defendant^ forfeiture of the 
leasehold and of plaintiff*s right to maintain 
this action." Id. at 943, 
The court then explained: 
"The right to recover possession in an 
action such as this is based on the idea that 
the tenant has forfeited his leasehold. Not-
withstanding the breach by a lessee of any 
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covenant that he may have made in the lease 
contract, the lessor may or may not elect to 
treat the breach as a forfeiture of the lease. 
Here, by his notice to give the bond or re-
deliver possession, served November 11, 1917, 
and by this action for restitution of posses-
sion and the cancellation of the lease, plaintiff 
elected to treat the lease as forfeited. But 
notwithstanding this election, he thereafter 
could waive the forfeiture of the lease and his 
right to insist thereon as a ground for resti-
tution of possession and cancellation of the lease 
contract. This plaintiff did by accepting rent 
for months succeeding that in which he served upon 
defendant the three days1 notice. Waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right, or 
such conduct as warrants an inference of the 
relinquishment of such right - an election by one 
to forego some advantage he could have taken or 
insisted upon. A person who is in a position to 
assert a right or insist upon an advantage may, by 
his words or conduct, and without reference to any 
act or conduct of the other party affected there-
by, waive such right. Once such right is waived, 
it is gone forever; the person who has waived the 
right will thereafter be precluded from asserting 
it. 'The courts, not favoring forfeitures, are 
usually inclined to take hold of any circumstances 
which indicate an election to waive a forfeiture1." 
(Citation omitted). Id. at pages 943 to 944. 
The Rule of Waiver is Applied 
to all Breaches by the Tenant 
In the court below, the plaintiff attempted to 
draw a distinction between the results of a breach for improper 
assignment (apparently conceding that acceptance of rent waived 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an improper assignment), and for other breaches by a lessee. 
The cases apply no such distinction in holding that acceptance 
of rent is a waiver of the breach. The cases are clear that 
the waiver extends to "breach of covenant or other wrongful 
acts,f [Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943 at 946 (8th Cir. 
1959)]. The cases cited involve waiver of breaches for failure 
to pay rent; Guptill v. Macon Stone Supply Co., 140 Ga. 696, 
79 S.E.854 (1913); improper assignment, Jensen v. 0. K. 
Investment Company, 29 Utah 2d 231, 507 P.2d 713 (1973); 
Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1920); 
Major v. Hall, 251 So.2d 444 (La. 1971); failure to post 
bond, Jones v. Delia Maria, 191 P.943 (Cal. 1920); failure 
to pay taxes, Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (1973); 
Snyder v. Hill, 45 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1951); failure to build 
buildings, Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1959); 
improper use of the premises, Roseman v. Day, 345 Mass. 93 
185 N.E.2d 650 (1962); and failure to repair, Larson v. 
Sjogern, 226 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1951). In Larson v. Sjogern, 
the plaintiff attempted to forfeit a lease, alleging that 
"the fences on the land were not kept in repair in violation 
of the agreement in the lease and that the land was over-
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grazed, and that a reservoir was built on the land without 
the consent of the lessor, and that this constituted waste11. 
226 P.2d at 182. Drawing no distinction between the facts 
presented by that case and any other waiver case, the Wyoming 
court held that by acceptance of rent, the alleged breaches 
had been waived. 
Thus, the principle of waiver is universally applied 
to any breach by the tenant. 
The Subjective Intent of 
the Plaintiff is Irrelevant 
In the face of the overwhelming authority that the 
acceptance of rent constitutes a waiver as a matter of law, the 
plaintiff says that in spite of its actions in accepting the 
rent, its subjective intention is controlling. It being clear 
that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law because of the admitted fact of plaintiff's inordinate 
retention of a rent check in June and July 1974 prior to giving 
notice of breach or filing suit and its later acceptance of 
rent in December 1974 and thereafter, plaintiff attempts to 
create out of whole cloth an issue of fact in an effort to 
avoid summary judgment. 
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The plaintiff now asserts that it accepted the rent 
payments, Mas a gesture of good faith1' pursuant to terms of a 
"tentative11 settlement agreement and acceptance of rent was 
"a gesture of good faith". Plaintiff contends that it did not 
intend to waive the breaches when it accepted the rent (pages 9 
and 10 of plaintiff's brief). The labored explanation of this 
contention is itself revealing, but it is also of paramount 
importance that there is nothing whatever in the record to 
support any such contention. The only item in the record is 
the letter of defendant's lawyer to plaintiff's lawyer dated 
December 23, 1974, by which the checks were transmitted and 
which states "I am pleased that you see the error of your 
ways, and as you requested I am returning herewith the rent 
checks you previously delivered to me. The following checks 
of Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Incf, are enclosed,," (R. 90, 
Vol, 2), This item alone shows that no such agreement or 
understanding existed, but be that as it may, for purposes of 
this appeal, the whole preposterous proposition is not relevant. 
i 
There was never even a "tentative" settlement agree-
ment, but merely a proposal explored by counsel that counsel 
agreed to present to their respective clients as a possibility < 
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for settling the case. Also, as indicated in footnote 4 
above, if the informal discussions between counsel are 
somehow to be interjected (and it is submitted that to do so 
would be grossly improper) the plaintiff must accept the 
fact that its own counsel was aware that accepting the 
rent raised the spectre of waiver, but nevertheless said 
his client wanted the rent. 
It is apparently plaintiff's contention that "the 
question of appellant's intent" when it accepted the rent 
is a factual question that prevents summary judgment. 
However, the law is that the acceptance of rent by the plain-
tiff conclusively establishes a waiver. This is the teach-
ing of all of the cases on this point. It is very seldom 
that a landlord announces: "By accepting the rent, I am 
hereby waiving all breaches". But the law says that certain 
conduct, the acceptance of rent, is as conclusive as such an 
announcement and precludes reliance on breaches occurring 
before the rent is accepted. Appellant simply cannot in 
one breath forfeit the lease and in another take the rent. 
It is significant that to this very day the plaintiff continues 
to accept the rent. 
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This legal principle is well expressed in the case 
of Miller v. Reidv. 260 P.358 (Cal. 1927), a case that plain-
tiff inappropriately cites in its own brief. In that case, 
the defendant lessee sublet the leased premises without the 
consent of the lessor in violation of the lease agreement. 
Immediately thereafter, the lessors took steps to bring 
about a forfeiture of the lease. Subsequent to that time, 
however, the rental payments required by the lease were 
paid and accepted. Upon each such acceptance the lessor 
executed a receipt stating that acceptance of rent was "with-
out prejudice of any of my rights under the lease of said 
premises11. In upholding the trial court *s determination 
that in spite of such a reservation by the lessor, he had 
waived the breach of the lease by acceptance of rent, the 
California Appellate Court states: 
"This was a clear attempt to eat the cake 
and still keep it. His actions belie his 
words. Waiver is a question of intention. 
(Citation omitted). For the lessors month 
after month to accept rents specified in 
the lease, and at the same time declare 
that there was a forfeiture, results in 
an irreconcilable inconsistency." 
Id. at 360. 
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It is clear, therefore, that regardless of what a 
lessor's subjective intent may be, by his action of accepting 
rent with knowledge of a breach, he is deemed to have waived 
the breach. 
Even if it is conceded, for purposes of the argument 
here, that plaintiff did have the "good faith" intention on 
which its argument here rests at the time it accepted the 
several past rental checks in December 1974, how can that 
immunize the plaintiff from waiver each month thereafter when 
it accepts the rent? Plaintiff certainly knew there was no 
settlement when it served a massive set of written interroga-
tories on April 8, 1975 (R. 43-52, Vol. 2) and a request for 
trial setting on April 28 (R. 58, Vol, 2) and discovery there-
after continued. The fact that appellant continued to accept 
the rent month after month firmly establishes its waiver of 
the alleged breaches of the lease. 
Not one persuasive authority is cited by plaintiff in 
support of this main portion of its argument about its subtle 
subjective intention to take the rent and forfeit the lease. 
In the face of a very substantial body of law, plaintiff 
presents a handful of readily distinguishable and inapposite 
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cases and lamely cites two cases (perhaps for inapplicable 
dicta) the holdings of which are directly to the contrary of 
the proposition for which they are cited. 
The case chiefly relied upon by the plaintiff 
acknowledges that the waiver need not be expressed in words 
and further states that a clear act of the party is suffi-
cient to constitute a waiver and that it is not necessary 
that there be an express waiver. Lucas Hunt Village Co. v. 
Klein, 218 S.E.2d 595 (Mo. 1949), This case is factually 
inapposite and does not run counter to the plethora of authority 
cited above. In that case the lessor's bookkeeper, who 
handled 606 rent accounts, inadvertently accepted one month's 
rent after the lessee had breached the lease. As soon as 
the mistake was discovered, no further payments were accepted. 
There was in that case no evidence of "knowing" acceptance of 
rent, In the case here before the court, however, there is 
not, nor can there be, any claim of inadvertence or mistake 
by the plaintiff. 
Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943, although cited 
by plaintiff, does not support its position, as the holding 
in that case is squarely against that position. The same is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
true of Miller v, Reidy, 260 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1927). 
In Re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 
1938), cited by plaintiff, is also inapplicable. The decision 
of the court in that case was governed by a specific provision 
in the lease whereby the parties had agreed that: 
11
 , , .the receipt of rent with knowledge of 
any breach shall not be deemed to be a waiver 
as to any breach of any covenant or condition 
herein contained." Id. at 308. 
There is no such provision in this lease nor any other agreement 
to that effect, 
B.J,M, Realty Corporation v. Ruggieri, 326 F.2d 281 
(2d Cir. 1964) relied upon by plaintiff, is also readily dis-
tinguishable. At the time that case was heard, the lessee had 
filed for bankruptcy and because of a bankruptcy rule that 
payments made by a bankrupt to a lessor could not be considered 
to be "rent" until the court had given its permission to affirm 
the lease, an issue entirely different from the present one 
controlled the case. The issue in the B.J.M. Realty Corporation 
case was whether an acceptance of "rent" had taken place. That 
issue is expressed in the following language from that opinion: 
"In order to prevail, the trustee must prove 
that the landlord accepted fas rent1 the pay-
ments made to him by the debtor after the landlord 
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had learned that the forfeiture provision 
of the lease had been breached." 
Id. at 283, 
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the pay-
ments made to the plaintiff were rent under the terms of the 
lease and the B.J.M. Realty Corporation case, therefore, has 
no application. 
Plaintiff's attempted reliance on Merkowitz v. 
Mahoney, 215 P.2d 317 (Colo. 1949) is likewise misplaced. 
In that case, unlike the present case, many of the breaches 
relied upon by the landlord in his action for forfeiture 
occurred after his acceptance of rent had ceased. As stated 
on pages 319-320 of that decision: 
"It next is contended under the heading of 
'waiver and estoppel' that the acceptance 
of rent accruing after the cause of forfeit-
ure, with knowledge of such cause, is a 
waiver of the right of forfeiture. Again 
assuming that this is a correct statement 
of applicable law and assuming that it would 
in fact bar the termination of the lease 
upon the other grounds alleged, which we do 
not deem it necessary to discuss, still the 
record discloses that the last rental received 
by the plaintiff was in August 1947, and 
there is substantial evidence of repeated 
and regular violation of the lease . . . and 
subsequent breaches were not waived by receipt 
of rent." 
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Furthermore, those amounts of rent which were paid 
during the pendency of the Merkowitz case were paid to the 
clerk of the court, rather than to the plaintiff (p. 320). 
With respect to the effect of that arrangement upon the waiver 
issue, the court stated: 
"The very fact that the payments were made 
from month to month to, and accepted by, 
the court in which the action was pending 
without dismissal of the action would 
establish conclusively that they were made 
either by stipulation or by order of court 
as in lieu of bond for the protection of 
the landlord pending the litigation, and 
not as an intended waiver of default and 
recognition of the continuance of the 
lease/1 Id. at 321. 
Although because of the special circumstances present 
in the Merkowitz case, the general rule regarding waiver 
through the acceptance of rent was not applicable, the court 
nevertheless reaffirmed that rule. On page 320 it stated: 
"It is the general rule that any act done 
by a landlord, with knowledge of an exist-
ing right of forfeiture, which recognizes 
the existence of the lease is a waiver of 
the right to enforce the forfeiture . . . 
where a landlord after violation of the 
lease has his election to declare the lease 
at an end or to permit it to continue, the 
acceptance of rent due thereafter is usually 
held to constitute an election to waive the 
forfeiture, and, having made his election, 
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the landlord cannot thereafter rely on 
the past default as ground of terminat-
ing the lease." 
Wecht v. Anderson, 444 P.2d 501 (Nev. 1968) and 
Myers v. Herskowitz, 165 P.1031 (Cal. 1917), cited by plaintiff, 
are similarly distinguishable. In those cases, as in Merkowitz, 
the breaches alleged by the plaintiff as the grounds for those 
suits took place after the acceptance of rent had ceased. 
Moreover, in Myers, to avoid waiving the lessee's forfeiture, 
the lessor refused to accept the rent. In an attempt to 
circumvent this action, the lessee deposited the amount of the 
rent in the lessor's bank account. For obvious reasons, the 
court found such action not to constitute a waiver. 
The Law Abhors a Forfeiture 
It is universally recognized that forfeitures are 
not favored by the law and waivers of the right to declare a 
forfeiture will be readily found. In Larson v. Sjogern, 
226 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1951), the Wyoming Supreme Court stated: 
"Forfeitures are not favored, since that 
is a harsh method by which to deprive a 
party of his rights . . . Such forfeiture 
may be waived and since it is not favored, 
slight circumstances will at times suffice 
to constitute a waiver. Thus it is stated 
in 32 Am. Juris. 747: 
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'Generally speaking, any recognition by 
the lessor of a tenancy as subsisting after a 
right of entry has accrued, where the lessor 
has notice of the forfeiture, will have the 
effect of a waiver of the landlord's right 
to a forfeiture of the leasehold. Slight 
acts on the part of the lessor may be suf-
ficient. Indeed, it has been ruled that any 
act on the part of the lessor, by word or 
deed, with knowledge of what has been done, 
which signifies his intention to affirm the 
lease, is conclusive evidence of a waiver 
of the forfeiture.1 . . . Thus, too, the 
payment and acceptance of rent, after breach, 
with knowledge thereof as is true in this 
case, will ordinarily waive the causes for 
forfeiture.!f Id. at 182 to 183. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, in Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 
1959), stated: 
"We approach the problem mindful of the 
universally recognized principle of law 
that forfeiture, which is the right of a 
landlord to terminate a lease because of 
the lessee's breach of covenant or other 
wrongful act, is not favored by the courts." 
Id. at 946. 
Other courts have used stronger language in express-
ing this rule. In Duncan v. Malcomb, 351 S,W.2d 419, 420 
(Ark. 1961), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated: "Of course, 
it is elementary that equity abhors forfeitures". The 
California court stated in Churchill v. Kellstrom, 
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136 P.2d 602, 605 (Cal. 1943), "Both in law and in equity 
forfeitures are abhorred but by the same token waivers are 
favored." 
Because of the disfavored status of forfeitures, 
waivers are readily found and even slight acts on the part 
of the lessor will constitute a waiver of lease violation. 
For example, in Borst v. Ruff, 77 Atlantic 2d 343 (Conn. 1950), 
two checks tendered by the lessee were dishonored for insuf-
ficient funds. A notice to quit was served and an action 
commenced. While the action was pending, several checks were 
tendered by the tenants. These checks were accepted but 
never cashed. At trial the court held that merely retaining 
these checks without cashing them constituted a waiver of 
the right to declare a forfeiture, and that finding was upheld 
by the Connecticut court, which stated: 
"Such acceptance by the landlord renewed 
the tenancy and waived the default." 
Id. at 344. 
Thus, in this case, the mere retention (prior to the filing of 
these suits by plaintiff) from prior to June 26 until July 3 
(R. 130-133, Vol. 2) by Woodland of the defendant's check 
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tendered in June 1974 for rent for July 1974 was sufficient 
to constitute a waiver. 
This general rule disfavoring forfeitures has been 
adopted by this court. In Peterson v, Hodges, 121 Utah 72, 
239 P.2d 180 (1951), a case involving the attempted forfeiture 
of a lease of real property, this court stated: 
"Forfeitures are not favored. Even 
contracts which expressly provide for 
a forfeiture will not be extended beyond 
the strict and literal meaning of the 
language used.11 Id. at 184. 
Under established case law, it is evident that even 
by slight acts indicating an affirmance of the lease, a land-
lord waives any breach by the tenant. 
In an admittedly different but analogous factual 
situation dealing with a vendor's attempt to forfeit an 
installment land contract, the rule was also recognized by 
this court. In Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Invest-
ment Company. 3 U.2d 121, 299 P.2d 709 (1955), this Court 
stated: 
"It is fundamental that a vendor cannot 
claim a forfeiture and at the same time 
receive the purchase money. [Citation 
omitted]. A vendor by receiving money 
when past due is precluded from availing 
himself of any right of forfeiture which 
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has arisen because of the failure to 
pay one installment on time. The cross-
appellant objects that the formal elements 
of waiver are not present in this instance 
and that the defendant did not: detrimentally 
change its position in reliance upon the 
action of the sellers in accepting its 
payments late. The proposition that defen-
dant would order its bank to pay $254.85 
a gratuity to its vendors, who are attempt-
ing to declare forfeiture, is indeed open 
to doubt; but whether we regard the sellers1 
action as a waiver or as an election to 
disregard the breach and continue the 
contract, the act of accepting payments under 
the contract is unequivocal in its legal effect. 
As we said in Kohler v. Lundberg, 54 U.339, 
180 P.590, 592: 'Courts of equity are loth 
to enforce a forfeiture, especially when a 
refusal to do so, as in this case, gives to 
all parties to the agreement every right to 
which they are entitled, and thus in no way 
works a hardship upon anyone'." Id. at 
710-711. 
The Swain case presents another reason for affirming 
the judgment here. As in that case, the refusal to enforce 
a forfeiture of the lease, will give the parties here every 
right to which they are entitled, and thus no hardship will 
be imposed on anyone. The plaintiff has received and continues 
to receive all of the rent (both the fixed minimum and per-
centage rent) to which it is entitled under the lease. The 
defendant, on the other hand, has expended much effort and 
money (in excess of $54,000 in 1974 alone, the year in question 
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in this case) in repairing, maintaining and improving the 
theatre premises (R. 100-105; 127-129, Vol. 2) and it would 
work a substantial hardship on defendant to lose the benefit 
of such efforts and expenditures. Furthermore, any breaches 
which plaintiff contends to have occurred have all been 
corrected (R. 100-116, Vol. 2). 
II 
THE DEFENDANT HAD NO DUTY TO 
MAXIMIZE REVENUES AND PLAINTIFF 
HAS NO PROPER CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
The case first filed by plaintiff sought to forfeit 
the lease under the unlawful detainer statute (R. 1-5, Vol. 1). 
Several weeks later, apparently as an afterthought, another 
complaint was filed (R. 2-23, Vol. 2). The second complaint 
was virtually the same as the first, except that it sought 
large damages. The basis for this damage claim was a new 
allegation to the effect that the defendant, as a tenant under 
a so-called "percentage leaseff has an implied obligation to 
maximize revenues earned from the leased premises and that the 
defendant, because of the breaches of the lease previously 
alleged, had not maximized revenues and had, therefore, breached 
this obligation. Also, in its brief here, in an effort to 
avoid the mandate of the authorities suggested above, plaintiff 
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obliquely suggests that acceptance of rent does not waive 
"material breaches of a lease agreement". (Page 16-18 
plaintiff's brief). This latter point will be discussed 
first. 
Acceptance of Rent Waives 
All Existing Breaches 
Plaintiff, by ignoring the very substantial 
authority to the effect that acceptance of rent waives 
a forfeiture (this point having been fully argued in the 
court below), appears to concede that it has no right to 
forfeit the lease and that at least to that extent the 
summary judgment is correct. In a rather weak effort to 
avoid the full impact of its waiver, however, the plaintiff 
suggests that somehow the breaches may be subsisting for 
purposes other than forfeiture. 
The authorities dealing with the question of waiver 
through the knowing acceptance of rent, including those cited 
under Point I above, do not draw a distinction between the 
waiver of forfeiture and the waiver of other remedies, it 
being generally stated that the knowing acceptance of rent 
waives a'breach of the lease. (See cases cited underPoint I 
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above) . In the trial court the thrust of this part of 
plaintiff's argument was to the effect that the rule of 
waiver applied only to certain types of breaches and that 
it did not extend to breaches of covenants to repair and 
maintain the premises. The argument appears to be abandoned, 
but, as discussed above at page 13, it must be emphasized here 
that the rule of waiver is applied, regardless of the type 
of breach or whether the remedy sought for such breach is 
forfeiture or damages or both. 
As stated in Bedford Investment Company v. Folb, 
180 P. 2d 361 (Cal. 1947), discussed in detail under Point I: 
"The payment of rent obviously bars any 
judgment against appellants for the rent 
and it likewise bars a judgment either for 
damages or for possession.11 Id. at 363. 
(Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff cites several cases on pages 16 to 18 
of its brief in a feeble attempt to support its position on 
this issue. However, careful review of those cases reveals 
that they do not support plaintiff's contention. For example, 
Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S,2d 293 (1972), does not acknowledge 
a landlord's right to sue for damages despite a waiver of 
the right to terminate the lease. Although in its decision, 
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the word damages was used, in essence the court simply stated 
that the lessor had the right to enforce a provision in the 
lease requiring the lessee to pay taxes for the period it was 
actually in possession. This is consistent with respondent's 
position, as it is not contended that by accepting rent appel-
lant has waived its right to require such payments. On the 
contrary, the acceptance of rent is considered to be a reaffirm-
ation of the lease. 
Klein v. Long, 34 A.2d 359 (Mun. Ct. of Appeals, 
D.C., 1943) deals with the commission of waste on the leased 
premises, an issue not raised in the present case. In that 
case, due to the very substantial detrimental and permanent 
modification of the premises by the tenant, the court found 
the tenant guilty of "waste". No claim of waste is made in 
this case, nor could it be. Waste is a term of art in real 
property law and has no application in this case. 
As is evident from the previous discussion under 
Point I of the Wecht decision, the remaining case cited by 
appellant, it also does not support appellant's position. 
Through the knowing acceptance of rent, appellant 
waived the alleged breaches, including any claims it: may have 
had for damages, 
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There is No Implied 
Covenant to Maximize Revenues 
Plaintiff's claim for damages is bottomed on its 
allegation that there is an implied covenant under a percen-
tage lease that the tenant will operate the business on the 
premises in a manner to maximize revenues and thereby 
maximize the amount of percentage rent earned by the lessor. 
This contention that there is such an implied covenant in 
the lease is added to the allegations in the second complaint, 
which are otherwise the same as those in the first complaint 
by paragraphs 13, 14 and 15, which read in relevant part 
as follows: 
"13. Pursuant to the provision of the 
lease and in accordance with the intent 
of the parties that Woodland receive part of 
its compensation from a percentage of the 
gross receipts above the minimum guaranteed 
annual lease payments provided for in the 
lease, defendants were obliged to . . . 
operate the theatre in a prudent, diligent 
and businesslike manner and to acquire the 
finest available motion picture products 
suitable for display at the theatre so as to 
maximize the revenue therefrom such that 
Woodland would receive the benefit of the 
gross proceeds which would result from such 
prudent, diligent, and businesslike 
operation of the theatre. 
- 37 -
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"14. That defendants breached their 
obligation under the lease . . . and 
failed to operate the theatre in a 
prudent, diligent and businesslike 
manner and failed to acquire the finest 
available motion picture products 
suitable for display at the theatre, and 
therefore, failed to maximize the revenue 
therefrom. 
"15. That as a result of defendant's 
breaches . . , Woodland has been damaged 
by reason of . . . loss of revenue from 
the percentage of gross revenue to which 
it is entitled and which it would have 
received . . ." 
An examination of the relevant provisions of the 
lease and the authorities in this area reveals that no 
such implied covenant exists. 
Paragraph 2 of the lease agreement provides for the 
payment of a substantial guaranteed annual rental of $32,500, 
In addition, it provides for the payment to the lessor of: 
ffA. Fifteen per cent (15%) of the gross 
admission receipts, if any, of the theatre 
in excess of One Hundred Eighty-Three 
Thousand Three Hundred and Thirty Three 
Dollars ($183,333.00), and 
lfB. Fifteen percent (15%) of the gross 
concession receipts, if: any, of the 
theatre in excess of Sixty Five Thousand 
Dollars ($65,000). 
"The gross admission receipts and gross 
concession receipts of the theatre upon 
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determination of the percentage rental, 
if any, due under this lease are to be 
computed, shall be calculated at the end 
of each year of the term of this lease 
and the amount of percentage rental, 
if any, due the Lessor as percentage 
rental shall be paid by the Lessee with-
out demand no later than thirty (30) 
days after the end of each such lease 
year." (Emphasis added). 
Paragraph 2 also states: 
"The Lessee in no way guarantees that 
there shall be any percentage rental 
earned and due and payable under the 
terms and conditions of this lease. 
(Emphasis added). 
It is abundantly clear from the provisions of the 
lease that the respondent lessee was under no duty to see 
that sufficient revenues were realized from the leased premises 
to insure the payment of any percentage rental, let alone a 
maximum percentage rental as appellant suggests. The language 
of the lease, therefore, contradicts the allegations in the 
complaint. 
Even without this language, the cases establish 
that there is no duty to maximize revenues. In fact, it is 
generally held that where a percentage lease provides for the 
payment of a minimum guaranteed rental which is not merely 
nominal, the payment of the minimum rental completely fulfills 
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the lessee's rental obligations under the lease. Any-
additional rental is considered as merely a bonus to the 
lessor. Furthermore, the cases generally hold that not 
only is the lessee under no obligation to maximize the 
lessorfs percentage rental, but as long as he pays the 
minimum rental, he has no obligation even to continue to 
do business on the premises. Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. 
App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (1951); Percoff v. Solomon, 259 
Ala. 482, 67 So.2d 31 (1953); Cousins Investment Co. v. 
Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal, App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878 
(1941); Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26 N.J. Super. 
477, 98 A.2d 121 (1953); Monte Corp. v. Stephens, 324 P.2d 
538 (Okla. 1958); Wheil v. N. Lewis Shops, Inc., 281 S.W. 
2d 651 (Tex. 1955); Palm V. Mortgage Investment Co. of El 
Paso, 229 S.W. 2d 869 (Tex, 1950);Stern v, Dunlap, 228 
F,2d 939 (10th Cir. 1955). 
Stern v. Dunlap Co,, supra, is representative of 
the cases in this area. Although that case arose out of 
New Mexico, the opinion is not based upon the law of any 
particular jurisdiction. In that case the plaintiffs owned 
a store building in Las Cruces, New Mexico, in which they had 
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for many years conducted a drygoods mercentile business. 
In 1946, plaintiffs conveyed the stock of merchandise 
and leased the premises to the tenant under a percentage 
lease with a guaranteed minimum rental of $350 per month. 
The lease also provided that the lessee would keep the pre-
mises in good repair and that it would remodel the store 
front at its own expense. Defendant operated the business 
in substantially the same manner as it had been operated 
by the plaintiff until 1958. In that year, defendant opened 
another store in the same city, By changing the leased store 
to a "bargain center11, while shifting the high quality line 
of merchandise to the new store, and by juggling the names, 
promotional budgets, charge accounts, and other items between 
the two stores, the defendant was able to shift much of the 
business and good will of the leased premises to its new 
store. As a result, the gross sales of the leased store and 
the percentage rental paid to the plaintiff dropped substantial-
ly. The plaintiff claimed that defendant had thereby breached 
an implied covenant. The trial court withdrew from the jury 
the issues relating to rental and to injury or damage to the 
reputation of the premises, finding that no implied covenant 
existed. In sustaining this action, the Tenth Circuit said: 
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11
 . . . In its major aspect the cause of 
action by the appellants was in substance 
an asserted past and continuing breach of 
covenant to conduct on the leased premises 
during the entire term of the lease a mercantile 
store dealing in the sale of high class mer-
chandise similar in quality to that previously 
carried in stock by the appellants. It was 
implicit in the lease agreement that the parties 
contemplated that the appellee would use the 
premises for the conduct of a mercantile business. 
But the lease did not contain any provision that 
the appellee would conduct on the premises a 
business dealing in the sale of high class 
merchandise similar in quality to that pre-
viously handled and sold thereon by the appellants. 
The lease was completely silent in that respect. 
But the appellants relied on an implied covenant 
obligating the appellant to conduct on the 
premises the business of that kind . . . The 
provision in respect to rental was clear. The 
monthly payment of $350.00 rental represented a 
substantial rental, not a mere nominal sum. A 
further sum was to be paid annually, based upon 
a percentage gross sales. And rental was paid 
in strict accord with such terms of the agreement. 
We are clear in the view that the changing of 
the nature of the business conducted on the leased 
premises did not constitute a breach of an implied 
covenant [of] the lease with resulting wrongful 
invasion of the rights of the appellants in 
respect to rental.11 (Citations omitted). 
Id, at 942 and 943. 
Thus, even where the lessee has taken affirmative 
action to reduce the lessor?s percentage rental, there is no 
implied covenant on the part of the lessee to maximize rents 
nor is there a breach of any rental covenant. In the present 
/. o 
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case, plaintiff did not allege any intentional reduction of 
revenues, but its only contention was that respondent could 
conceivably have generated more revenue than it did. 
In Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corporation, 
377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954), the Pennsylvania court 
sustained the granting of a demurrer to the complaint, holding 
that there is no implied covenant to continue the business or 
maximize revenue. Explaining the tremendous practical problems 
which a court would face if it were to find such an implied 
covenant, the court stated: 
ffIf an implied covenant, as claimed by 
plaintiff, should be held to arise in such cases 
what would be the extent of the restriction 
thereby imposed on the lessee? Would it extend 
to each and every act on his part that might 
serve to reduce the extent of his business and 
thereby the percentage rental based thereon? 
Would it forbid him, for example, if operating 
a retail store, from keeping it open for a fewer 
number of hours each day than formerly? Would 
it forbid him from dismissing salesmen whereby 
his business might be reduced in volume? Would 
it forbid him from discontinuing any depart-
ment of his business even though he found it 
to be operating at a loss? It would obviously 
be quite unreasonable and wholly undesirable 
to imply an obligation that would necessarily 
be vague, uncertain and generally impracticable/1 
Id. at 582. 
The reluctance of the courts to allow the lessor 
to meddle in the lessee-s affairs and to second guess his 
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business decisions has been a substantial factor influencing 
their refusal to find an implied covenant in percentage 
leases requiring the lessee to maximize revenue. 
In refusing to find an implied covenant, the 
decisions also rely on the general rule that implied 
covenants are not favored by the law and will not be implied 
where the language of the lease is clear. This rule has been 
followed in Utah. Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 U.2d 163, 
321 P. 2d 221 (1958); and Flowers v. Wrights, Inc., 227 P.2d 
768, 119 Utah 378 (1951), (two cases dealing with percentage 
leases). In the Ephraim Theatre Co. case, the literal terms 
of a theatre lease did not provide any minimum monthly rental, 
but provided for the lessor to be compensated by receiving 
a portion of the profits. When the business proved to be 
unprofitable, the lessor brought an action for rent, claiming 
that in the interest of fairness, the contract should be so 
construed as to impose upon the defendant an obligation to 
pay a fixed monthly rental. In refusing to read such an 
implied obligation into the lease agreement, this court 
stated: 
"It would defeat the very purpose of formal 
contracts to permit a party to invoke the 
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use of words or conduct inconsistent 
with its terms to prove that the parties 
did not mean what they said, or to use such 
inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate 
uncertainty or ambiguity where none would 
otherwise exist. Generally speaking, neither 
of the parties, nor the court has any right 
to ignore or modify the conditions which 
are clearly expressed merely because it may 
subject one of the parties to hardship, but 
they must be enforced fin accordance with 
the intention as . . . manifested by the 
language used by the parties to the contract'." 
Id, at 223. 
In the Flowers case, this court again emphasized 
that: 
"While we must enforce the lease in accord-
ance with the intent of the parties, we 
must find that intent from the language of 
the lease itself, especially when it is 
clearly expressed." Id, at 771. 
Although plaintiff on page 20 of its brief attempts 
to create a factual issue by claiming that parole evidence 
should be considered in interpreting the lease, and that an 
implied covenant should be read into it, extraneous evidence 
must not be considered, unless the lease is ambiguous, In 
the present case, the language of the lease is clear, as it 
provides "The lessee in no way guarantees that there shall be 
any percentage rental earned and due and payable under the 
terms and conditions of this lease". There is, therefore, 
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no basis for plaintiff's assertion that parole evidence should 
be considered and an implied covenant to maximize revenues 
from the leased premises should be read into the lease. 
Plaintiff's attempted reliance on Flowers on pages 
21 to 23 of its brief reveals the weakness of its position 
on this question. The issue of whether there exists an 
implied covenant to maximize revenues under a percentage 
lease was never considered in that case. The sole question 
was whether a lessee under a percentage lease must account 
to his lessor for revenues received from a sublessee. The 
issues presented by this case and the Flowers case are, 
therefore, entirely different and that decision has no 
application to the present question. 
Plaintiff's citation of the dicta from the Flowers 
decision dealing with a lessor's remedies where he had been 
intentionally deprived of rent is likewise without application 
to the present issue, There is no allegation whatsoever that 
respondent has intentionally reduced the theatre revenues and, 
in fact, it would be preposterous to suggest that respondent 
would intentionally deprive itself of 85 per cent of the 
revenues in order to avoid the payment to appellant of 
15 per cent. 
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Cessna Loan Company v. Baron, 149 Wash. 386, 270 
P.1022 (1928), cited by plaintiff, is also inapplicable. In 
that case the landlord was not seeking damages or forfeiture 
due to the tenant's alleged breach as in this case, but was 
merely seeking to recover a percentage of the revenues realized 
by the tenant from departments of the business which had been 
moved from the leased premises to an adjoining building. The 
Washington Supreme Court made it clear that that particular 
issue was the only one under consideration as it stated "We 
do not decide any issue other than that squarely presented in 
this case". Id at 1024, That issue is not present in this 
case and consequently, the Cessna Loan case is not applicable. 
Plaintiff's citation of Williston on Contracts, 
Revised Edition, Vol, 1, Section 104A, at page 357, on page 16 
of its memorandum, is another indication of the weakness of 
plaintiffls position, That citation is taken from a section 
entitled "Consideration in Bilateral 'Requirement* and 'Output1 
Contracts", The cited statement makes no reference whatso-
ever to the maximization of profits under percentage leases, 
or even to leases, 
The case of State Auto & Casualty Underwriters v, 
Salisbury, 27 U,2d 204 (1972), 494 P.2d 529, likewise has no 
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application to the case at bar. That case dealt solely with 
an agent's duties to his principal. 
Unlike the present case, the lease in Mayfair 
Operating Corporation v. Vessemer Properties, Inc., 7 S.2d 
342 (Fla. 1942), contained an express provision requiring 
the lessee to "use its best efforts to obtain and maintain 
the highest volume of business on the premises". Id. at 342, 
The parties in Selber Brothers, Inc. v. Newstadt's 
Shoe Stores, 194 S.579 (La. 1940), had through three success-
ive lease agreements, established a well-settled course of 
dealing with one another. There is no such course of dealing 
here involved, and in this case the defendant took over a 
failing operation from a court-appointed receiver (R. 338-
339, Vol. 2), expressly provided in the lease there was no 
assurance that rental would be paid in excess of the minimum 
amount (R, 11, Vol, 1), and it is stretching to the utmost 
to say that plaintiff here has a right: to damages. Moreover, 
in the Selber case, 
" . . . the defendant made a drastic change 
in the use of the premises, more than four 
months before the expiration of the lease, and 
thereby willfully lessened the rental value 
of the place as a first-class shoe store, in 
order to divert the business to the new location 
which the defendant had rented more than four 
months before the expiration of this lease.11 
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Even if the Selber case were interpreted as plaintiff 
contends it should be, it is squarely against the over-
whelmingly large number of cases holding to the contrary. 
In this case, it is not contended that defendant 
has drastically changed the use of the premises, that it has 
willfully reduced the revenues therefrom, or that it has 
attempted to divert business from the leased premises to 
another theatre. In fact, the defendant does not operate 
any other drive-in theatre in the area and has no drive-in 
theatre to which it could divert revenues. It is undisputed 
that the respondent has continued to operate the theatre on 
a continual year-round basis, with plaintiff's contention 
being that respondent could conceivably have realized more 
revenues from the operation of the theatre. 
Both the authorities and the provisions of the 
lease itself make it clear that there is no basis for plaintiff's 
assertion that an implied covenant to maximize revenues 
from the leased premises should be read into the lease. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
By accepting rental payments under the lease, 
plaintiff waived the asserted breaches. Since both actions 
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filed by plaintiff were based on the alleged breaches, 
there is no longer any basis for the claims. In addition, 
defendant lessee had no obligation under the lease to 
maximize revenues, 
It is respectfully submitted that the summary 
judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this0^7^ day of August, 1976. 
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN & EVANS 
L. IT. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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